

### INSIGHT

Insurrection/revolution becomes ripe when many perceive an illegitimate inequality—that is, when the people see themselves as being exploited and oppressed for the undeserved enrichment and betterment of an elite few. This means that the guerrillas not only need an illegitimate inequality but they also need support of the people; otherwise, insurrection/revolution is impossible.

### ? - RAISES QUESTION - ?

In the deepest possible sense what does it mean to have support of the people?

MESSAGE

- Guerrillas must establish implicit connections or bonds with people and countryside.

In other words

- Guerrillas must be able to blend into the emotional-cultural-intellectual environment of people until they become one with the people.

In this sense

- People feelings and thoughts must be guerrilla feeling and thoughts while guerrilla feelings and thoughts become people feelings and thoughts; people aspirations must be guerrillas aspirations while guerrilla aspiration become people aspirations; people goals must be guerrilla goals while guerrilla goals become people goals.

RESULT

- Guerrillas become indistinguishable from people while government is isolated from people.



## MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

### Key to Success

- Ability to continuously demonstrate government weakness, erode government influence, and cause government to alienate itself from people.
- Support of people (both psychological and physical) for intelligence, recruits, shelter, transportation, refuge, food, money, and medical aid.
- Access to (more or less permanent) safe sanctuaries or base areas and/or fluid bases that can be shifted from place to place, away from enemy forces—in order to rest, recuperate, repair materiel, etc., as well as indoctrinate, train, and equip recruits.
- Use of stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action coupled with cohesion of guerrilla bands as basis for:
  - dispersion, to arouse people, to avoid adversary strength, and to force government to thin-out, or disperse, its strength;
  - concentration, to hit and wipe-out isolated fractions;
  - shifting of effort (in these as well as other activities), in order to gain and keep initiative.

GUERRILLA RESULTS

Successful

|   |                    |         |
|---|--------------------|---------|
| ● | American Colonies  | 1775-81 |
| ● | Spain              | 1808-14 |
| ● | Russia             | 1812    |
| ● | German East Africa | 1914-18 |
| ● | Arabia             | 1916-18 |
| ● | China              | 1927-49 |
| ● | Russia             | 1941-45 |
| ● | Yugoslavia         | 1941-45 |
| ● | Indochina          | 1945-54 |
| ● | Algeria            | 1954-62 |
| ● | Cuba               | 1956-59 |
| ● | South Vietnam      | 1958-75 |

Unsuccessful

|   |              |           |
|---|--------------|-----------|
| ● | Philippines  | 1899-1902 |
| ● | South Africa | 1900-02   |
| ● | Greece       | 1944-49   |
| ● | Philippines* | 1946-54   |
| ● | Malaya*      | 1948-60   |

\* Regime exercised particular care not to inflict casualties and to protect population.



## BLITZ/GUERRILLA THEME

### Essence

- Avoid battles--instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or seize those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion (e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of communication, command and supply centers,...).
- Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock again, again, again,....
- Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure.

### Intent

- Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

DISRUPT THE CONNECTIONS AND CENTERS THAT PROVIDE COHESION

Israeli example (a'la Gen. Y. Yadin - 1949)

"To exploit the principles of war for our purpose and base ourselves upon (the) strategic indirect approach, so as to determine the issue of the fighting even before fighting has begun, it is necessary to achieve the three following aims:

- (a) to cut the enemy's lines of communications, thus paralyzing his physical build-up;
- (b) to seal him off from his lines of retreat, thus undermining the enemy's will and destroying his morale;
- (c) to hit his centers of administration and disrupt his communications, thus severing the link between his brain and limbs."



? - KEY QUESTION - ?

Why have Blitz and Guerrilla tactics been so extraordinarily successful?



#### MESSAGE

- Blitz and Guerrillas, by being able to operate in a directed, yet more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker manner than their adversaries, can:
  - Repeatedly concentrate or disperse more inconspicuously and/or more quickly from or to lower levels of distinction (organizational, operational, and environmental) without losing internal harmony, as well as,
  - Repeatedly and unexpectedly infiltrate or penetrate adversaries' vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm disconnected remnants of adversary organism.

or put another way

- Blitz and Guerrillas, by operating in a directed, yet more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker manner, operate inside their adversaries' observation-orientation-decision-action loops or get inside their mind-time-space as basis to penetrate the moral-mental-physical being of their adversaries in order to pull them apart, and bring about their collapse.

#### UNDERLYING IDEA

- Such amorphous, lethal, and unpredictable activity by Blitz and Guerrillas make them appear awesome and unstoppable which altogether produce uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic,...and ultimately collapse—a notion implied by Sun Tzu around 400 B.C. and more recently by J.F.C. Fuller after observing the impact of Ludendorff's infiltration tactics in 1918.




? - NATURAL QUESTIONS - ?

- How can we defend against or counter the Blitz?
- How can we defend against of counter the Guerrilla Movement?



"Where are the Weaknesses  
of the Blity?"





KEY POINT

Difficult to sustain fast-tempo and maintain cohesion of Blitz effort when forced to repeatedly and rapidly shift concentration of strength against weakness.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
(Variation of German Experiences During WWII)

Posture

- Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.
- Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance and mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams together with artillery in region behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as well as move inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrusts.
- Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, anti-tank/infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough--or push-off for a Blitz counterstroke.

Action

- Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored reconnaissance teams to determine direction/strength of thrusts and to continuously harass by repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks in order to slow momentum and erode cohesion of Blitz attack.
- Inconspicuously move-in with high speed mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams, together with air and artillery support, to strengthen favorable sectors. Hit adversary thrusts and resupply efforts with ambushes and with repeated sudden/sharp flank and rear counter-thrusts to channel as well as drain-away momentum and break-up cohesion of Blitz thrusts.
- Concentrate swift armored combat forces (held in reserve) and use with air to rapidly drive a shallow and/or deep flank counterstroke in order to swing in behind and roll-up Blitz offensive in detail (counterstroke launched while adversary is moving forward).

Idea

- Smash Blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of counter-Blitz combat teams as basis for shifting of forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle momentum, shatter cohesion, and envelop Blitz in order to destroy adversary's capacity to resist.



## BLITZ AND COUNTER-BLITZ

### Main Features and Emphasis

- Intelligence and recce action
- Infiltration/penetration and isolation
- Ambiguity, deception, speed, and violence to generate surprise and shock
- Mission/Schwerpunkt philosophy
- Acceptance of "gaps" and (related) "risks" in support of mission/schwerpunkt philosophy
- Echelon-in-depth (offense and defense)
- Reserves reconstituted and accumulated (at all levels) to support or generate success
- Posture of positions, alternative positions, dummy positions and roving positions to mask maneuvers and intentions



### GUERRILLA/COUNTER-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGNS

#### Key Points

- Guerrilla vanguards need cause and support of people that is dependent upon regime's unwillingness/inability to come to grips with crises of its' own making.

or more simply

- Crises and vanguards represent the marriage of instability and initiative that create and expand guerrilla effort.

hence

- The thought occurs that in order to dry-up a guerrilla upsurge one should strike at those root causes or illegitimate inequalities that generate and exacerbate crises as well as provide a favorable climate for vanguards to form or operate in.



## COUNTER-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

### Action

- Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of people--rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.\*
- Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.\*
- Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.
- Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with outside world.
- Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to: inhibit guerrilla communication, coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.
- Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.
- Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas' own) tactics of reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt communication with outside world.
- Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.
- Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.

### Idea

- Break guerrillas' moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

\* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!



NOTE

We have indicated again and again the importance of popular support for guerrilla or counter-guerrilla success. Why?

INSIGHT

Without support of people the guerrillas (or counter-guerrillas) have neither a vast hidden intelligence network nor an invisible security apparatus that permits them to "see" into adversary operations yet "blinds" adversary to their own operations.



CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT



### CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

- Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
  - Attrition Warfare--as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
  - Maneuver Conflict--as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler's Generals (in particular Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur.
  - Moral Conflict--as practiced by the Mongols, most Guerrilla Leaders, a very few Counter-Guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.
- With these comments in mind let's look into the essentials of each.



#### ATIRITION OBSERVATIONS

- Firepower, as a destructive force, is king.
- Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken or dilute effects of enemy firepower.
- Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire.
- Measures of success are (now) "body count" and targets destroyed.
- Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon's dictum: Destroy enemy army.



## ESSENCE OF ATTRITION WARFARE

### Create and Exploit

- Destructive Force:

Weapons (mechanical, chemical, biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim, and/or otherwise generate widespread destruction.

- Protection:

Ability to minimize the concentrated and explosive expression of destructive force by taking cover behind natural or manmade obstacles, by dispersion of people and resources, and by being obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc., together with cover and dispersion.

- Mobility:

Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force or move away from adversary's destructive focus.

### Payoff

- Frightful and debilitating attrition via widespread destruction as basis to:

- Break enemy's will to resist
- Seize and hold terrain objectives

### Aim

Compel enemy to surrender and sue for peace.



#### OBSERVATIONS REGARDING MANEUVER

- Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or threat thereof) are used to generate surprise and shock.
- Fire and movement are used in combination, like Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere.
- Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other phenomena that suggests inability to adapt to change.



## ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT

### Create, Exploit, and Magnify

- Ambiguity

Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not be.

- Deception

An impression of events as they are not.

- Novelty

Impressions associated with events/ideas that are unfamiliar or have not been experienced before.

- Fast Transient Maneuvers

Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver event/state to another.

- Effort (Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt)

An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence--focused into, or thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist.

### Payoff

- Disorientation

Mismatch between events one (seemingly) observes or anticipates and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to.

- Surprise

Disorientation generated by perceiving extreme change (of events or efforts) over a short period of time.

- Shock

Paralyzing state of disorientation generated by extreme or violent change (of events or efforts) over a short period of time.

- Disruption

State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder.

### Aim

Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient or disrupt those that adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse.



NOTE

Surprise and Shock can also be represented as an overload beyond one's immediate ability to respond or adapt. In this context, we may view the "ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT" a bit differently—



## ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT

### Create, Exploit, and Magnify

- Ambiguity

Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not be.

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### Payoff

- Disorientation

Mismatch between events one observes or imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to.

- Disruption

State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder.

- Overload

A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one's mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure.

### Aim

- Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, or overload those that adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse;

or equivalently,

- Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull adversary apart and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.



## OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

GEN. HERMANN BALCK

### Theme

- No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc.
- Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet harmonize within intent of superior commanders.
- Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and ultimate success.
- Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience <sup>based</sup> upon trust—~~not mistrust~~—for cohesion.

### How is this Atmosphere Achieved?

- By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and moral authority to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within superiors intent.

### What is the Price?

- Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.
- Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger, demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.
- Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the traditional solution.

### Benefit

- Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.



OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

CYRIL FALLS — "THE ART OF WAR FROM THE AGE OF NAPOLEON TO THE PRESENT DAY" — 1961

Page 124

"In the First World War 'cellar life' had been a feature of the adversities of Paris, which actually came under the fire of specially built long-range guns in 1918, as well as aircraft bombing. In the East End of London air raids caused a tendency to panic in the latter part of 1917, and, whether there was a raid or not, some 300,000 people crowded each night into the underground railway stations and slept on the platforms....There was little organized civil defence beyond the reduction of lights.."

Page 161

"The Germans, who were far ahead of any rival in the science of lighter-than-air construction, refused to accept the general belief that the future lay entirely with the heavier-than-air. Their Zeppelins...were employed chiefly in night attacks on England. On one occasion a single airship did a million pounds worth of damage in a raid, but on the whole their success was mainly moral and measured in terms of absenteeism in factories and sensational drops in production of warlike material."

Page 165

"Early in the war the German Armies owed much in their victories in Poland, Belgium, and France to their dive-bombers. These aircraft acted in close support to the armour and infantry....They often put hostile artillery out of action, but generally by driving the detachments from their guns. The successes were won for the most part by moral rather than material effect. To troops unused to them, especially the French divisions of low categories, they proved extremely unsettling."



## OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

### Insights Regarding Falls' Statements and Balck's Ideas

- From Falls' comments we note (with slight alteration) the following words and phrases: panic...moral...absenteeism...sensational drops in production...divebombers success were for the most part moral...to troops unused to them...they proved extremely unsettling. A quick glance shows that all these words and phrases are directly related to one another.
- Going even further we can say: Falls' comments on pages 124, 161, and 165 suggest that moral effects are related to the menace posed by the zeppelins and divebombers, and the uncertainty associated with not knowing what to expect or how to deal with this menace. Put simply: Moral effects are related to menace and uncertainty.
- For a first cut this suggests that moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome menace and uncertainty.
- On the other hand, this first cut seems to leave out something that humans either need or must overcome for collective moral strength. Fortunately we have some clues:
  - First: Remember that Guerrilla Commanders (see Modern Guerrilla Campaign) stress use of propaganda, civil disorders, selected terrorism, etc., as basis to generate mistrust and discord.
  - Second: Balck emphasizes the importance of trust—~~not mistrust~~—for cohesion.
- Now, recognizing that both Balck and Guerrilla Commanders work in a hostile environment (of menace and uncertainty) that naturally breeds mistrust, it is clear that moral effects must include this factor.
- This suggest moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome, menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.



OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

- Now by using moral strength as a point of departure--and by feeding in those unsettling or threatening experiences (a'la Clausewitz) that either bring out fear, anxiety, and alienation, or their more noble counterweights: courage, confidence, and esprit--we can evolve the following related notions:
  - Moral Strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
  - Moral Victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps) over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
  - Moral Defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage, confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
  - Moral Values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
  - Moral Authority: Person or body that can give one the courage, confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
- Finally, by stripping away and recombining essentials--from these notions as well as from the ideas and experiences of Clausewitz, Balck, and Falls--we can evolve the Essence of Moral Conflict.



## ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT

### Create, Exploit, and Magnify

- Menace:

Impressions of danger to one's well being and survival.

- Uncertainty:

Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.

- Mistrust:

Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.

### Idea

- Surface, fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby magnify internal friction.

### Aim

Destroy moral bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.



SUSPICION

- The essence of moral conflict, as presented, seems to be one-sided and emphasizes the negative or dark side of one's moral make-up.

? - RAISES QUESTION - ?

- How do we bring out the positive side? In other words--if courage, confidence, and esprit represent the positive counterweights to fear, anxiety, and alienation--what are the positive counterweights to menace, uncertainty, and mistrust?



### INSIGHT

- In addressing this question we find that the counterweights to menace and uncertainty are not at all obvious unless we start with mistrust and work in reverse order. Proceeding in this way we note that:
  - The presence of mistrust implies that there is a rupture or loosening of the human bonds or connections that permit individuals to work as an organic whole in harmony with one another. This suggests that harmony itself represents an appropriate counterweight to mistrust.
  - In dealing with uncertainty, adaptability seems to be the right counterweight. Otherwise, how can one adjust to the unforeseen or unpredictable nature of uncertainty?
  - Finally, with respect to menace one cannot be passive. Instead, initiative is needed otherwise menace may obliterate the benefits associated with harmony and adaptability. Intuitively, this suggests that initiative is the right counterweight here.
- Using these ideas, together with the previous ideas already uncovered, we can modify and enrich the essence of moral conflict as follows:



## ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT

### Negative Factors

- Menace:  
Impressions of danger to one's well being and survival.
- Uncertainty:  
Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.
- Mistrust:  
Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.

### Counterweights

- Initiative:  
Internal drive to think and take action without being urged.
- Adaptability:  
Power to adjust or change in order to cope with new or unforeseen circumstances.
- Harmony:  
Interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way.

### Aim

- Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.

### Simultaneously,

- Build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.



SYNTHESIS



PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

- Goal
- Plan
- Action
- Support
- Command



## PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

### Goal

- Diminish adversary's freedom-of-action while improving our freedom-of-action, so that our adversary cannot cope, while we can cope, with events/efforts as they unfold.

### Plan

- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to sever adversary's moral ties and disorient or twist his mental images, hence mask-distort-magnify our presence and activities.
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
- Establish focus of main effort together with other (related) effort and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
- Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, obsessions, etc., of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to cope with unfolding circumstances.
- Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion and permit coherent observation-orientation-decision-action in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for absorption or mop-up.

### Action

- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

### Support

- Superior mobile communications
- Only essential logistics

} to maintain cohesion of overall effort and sustain appropriate pace of operations within available resources.

### Command

- Decentralize, in a tactical sense, to encourage lower-level commanders to shape, direct, and take the sudden/sharp actions necessary to quickly exploit opportunities as they present themselves.
- Centralize, in a strategic sense, to establish aims, match ambitions with means/talent, sketch flexible plans, allocate resources, and shape focus of overall effort.



### IMPRESSIONS

- Plan and Action statements suggest that we are trying to:
  - Penetrate adversary system and mask own system against his penetration;
  - Create a variety of impressions of what is occurring and what is about to occur;
  - Generate mismatches between what seems to be and what is;
  - Push adversary beyond his ability to adapt.
- Intentions that make-up Plan cannot happen without application of transients that make-up Action.



### FIRST IMPRESSION

- Note how these strategic and tactical ideas, that we evolved from the Plan and Action statements, fit-in nicely with the following comments by Napoleon:
  - "The art of land warfare is an art of genius, of inspiration. ...A general never knows anything with certainty, never sees his enemy clearly, never knows positively where he is. When armies are face to face, the least accident in the ground, the smallest wood, may conceal part of the enemy army. The most experienced eye cannot be sure whether it sees the whole of the enemy's army or only three-fourths. It is by the mind's eye, by the integration of all reasoning, by a kind of inspiration, that the general sees, knows, and judges."
  - "The first quality for a commander in chief is a cool head which receives a just impression of things; he should not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad news; the impressions which he receives successively or simultaneously in the course of a day should classify themselves in his mind in such a way as to occupy the place which they merit; because reason and judgment are the result of the comparison of various impressions taken into just consideration."
- Above comments, by Napoleon, reveal ever-present vulnerabilities and weaknesses that commanders and subordinates alike must accept.

hence
- If we turn these comments around and connect them with the tactical and strategic ideas presented thus far, we surface a modern notion of Grand Tactics.



WHICH BECOMES:

Grand Tactics

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create a tangle of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive;  
  
thereby
- Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos, ...and/or fold adversary back inside himself;  
  
thereby
- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.



## SECOND IMPRESSION

### Transients

- Observe, Orient, Decide and Act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity...

or put another way

- Operate inside adversary's Observation-Orient-Decision-Action loops or get inside his Mind-Time-Space.

Permits  
one to

### Intentions

- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to sever adversary's moral ties and disorient...
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
- Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
- Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, and obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to cope...
- Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary's vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities...in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.
- Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos,...to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse.
- Become an extraordinary commander.



WHICH LEADS TO:

Strategy

Penetrate adversary's moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert or seize those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary's will to resist.



## NOW ALTOGETHER

### Tactics

- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

### Grand Tactics

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;

thereby

- Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos, ...and/or fold adversary back inside himself;

thereby

- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.

### Strategy

- Penetrate adversary's moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert or seize those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary's will to resist.

### Strategic Aim

- Diminish adversary's capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope, while we can cope, with events/efforts as they unfold.



I - AN ALTERNATIVE PORTRAIT - I

Now, after some introspection, it is not difficult to see that these tactical and strategic statements are very definitely destructive in nature. Keeping these words in mind, while working backwards thru this presentation, one is left with the impression that the destructive attrition-maneuver-moral ideas played-out in the Categories of Conflict aren't much different than the tactical and strategic ideas that we have just discussed. As a consequence, by stripping-down and recombining the ideas associated with both these conceptual streams, we can evolve an alternative portrait of ruin as follows:



THEME FOR DISINTEGRATION AND COLLAPSE

Synthesize

● Lethal Effort:

Tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength as well as (or thereby) overload critical vulnerabilities and generate weaknesses.

● Maneuver:

Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize those vulnerable yet critical connections, centers, and activities as basis to penetrate, splinter, and isolate remnants of adversary organism for mop-up or absorption.

● Moral:

Create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and alienation to sever human bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.

Idea

- Destroy adversary's moral-mental-physical harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist.

Aim

Render adversary powerless by denying him the opportunity to cope with unfolding circumstances.



UNDERLYING INSIGHT

Unless one can penetrate adversary's moral-mental-physical being, and sever those interacting bonds that permit him to exist as an organic whole, as well as subvert or seize those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, one will find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to collapse adversary's will to resist.

which leads to

THE NAME-OF-THE-GAME

Morally-mentally-physically isolate adversary from allies or any outside support as well as isolate elements of adversary or adversaries from one another and overwhelm them by being able to penetrate and splinter their moral-mental-physical being at any and all levels.



? - RAISES QUESTION - ?

How do we connect the Tactical and Strategic notions or the  
Theme for Disintegration and Collapse with the National Goal?



--VIA A SENSIBLE GRAND STRATEGY THAT WILL:

- Support national goal.
- Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract the uncommitted.
- End conflict on favorable terms.
- Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.



## GRAND STRATEGY

### Essence

- Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.

### Basis

- An appreciation for the underlying self-interests, critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., that we as well as the uncommitted and any potential or real adversaries must contend with.



## PATTERN

### National Goal

- Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an everchanging environment.

### Grand Strategy

- Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.

### Strategic Aim

- Diminish adversary's capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope, while we can cope, with events/efforts as they unfold.

### Strategy

- Penetrate adversary's moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert or seize those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary's will to resist.

### Grand Tactics

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;

thereby

- Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos,...and/or fold adversary back inside himself;

thereby

- Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.

### Tactics

- Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.



### INSIGHT

On one hand, as shown on the previous chart, the National Goal and Grand Strategy tend to be constructive in nature. On the other hand, the Strategic Aim, Strategy, Grand Tactics, and Tactics are destructive in nature and operate over a shorter time frame. In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed, appear to be in disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick victory. This, combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern. Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous terms can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another.




#### FURTHER ELABORATION

Up to this point--by repeatedly adding, stripping-away, and recombining many different, yet similar, ideas and thoughts--we have examined the nature of conflict, survival, and conquest in many different ways. A review and further manipulation of the ideas and thoughts that make-up these different ways suggests that, for success over the long haul and under the most difficult conditions, one needs some unifying vision that can be used to attract the uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly resolve and drive and drain-away or subvert adversary resolve and drive. In other words, what is needed is a vision rooted in human nature so noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and determination of any competitors or adversaries. Moreover, such a unifying notion should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things. Put another way, we are suggesting a need for a supra-orientation or center-of-gravity that permits leaders, and other authorities, to inspire their followers and members to enthusiastically take action toward confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand in the way. Such a scheme can be portrayed as follows:



THEME FOR VITALITY AND GROWTH





APPLICATION



COUNTER-BLITZ

a'la SUN TZU



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

Maneuver Scheme

- Employ Cheng/Nebenpunkte as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly tie-up, divert, stretch-out, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose vulnerabilities and weaknesses for decisive stroke(s) by Ch'i/Schwerpunkt.

Aim

- Blind-side adversary regardless of circumstances.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

STRATEGY

Shape Adversary Impression

Arrange elements of defense (in harmony with penchant for humans to generate mental patterns), as basis to guide adversaries to form or project patterns on the environment they are facing. In other words, emphasize certain features so that adversary intelligence, recce, patrols, and other observation activity generate mental pictures of what we seem to be doing. In this sense, we cause adversary to project tempo or rhythm as well as a sense of form or gestalt upon the environment. Naturally, this raises the question: How do we want our posture to appear to an adversary--or put another way, what kind of mental picture do we want to generate in his mind?



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

STRATEGY

How?

Set-up positions echeloned-in-depth (similar to German philosophy) with flexibility to quickly rotate or shift both front and flank maneuver schemes--yet convince adversary (with help from "shaping" and "disruption" agencies/activities--intelligence, electronic warfare, etc.) that he is facing, for example, an in-depth strongpoint/checkerboard or multiple belts of an in-depth linear or elastic defense. In this sense, we suggest three belts or bands behind the front as follows:

- Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.
- Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance and mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams together with artillery in region behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as well as move inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrusts.
- Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, anti-tank/infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough--or push-off for a Blitz counterstroke.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

STRATEGY

Game

- Shift from such an ambiguous or misleading posture into a gauntlet defense with alternate channels, sectors, or zones by thinning-out some sectors or zones in order to strengthen others.
- Basic notion is to think in terms of channels, avenues, and gauntlets (instead of just belts, bands and fronts) so that ambush gauntlets will naturally evolve or be set-up to deal with forward as well as lateral (roll-out) thrusts of adversary. In this way, ambush gauntlets can then be set-up at any level from platoon to theater.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

TACTICS

Basic Maneuver

- Use obstacles, delaying actions, hit-and-run attacks, and/or baited retreats in thinned-out sectors/zones together with "shaping" and "disruption" activities to disorient adversary as well as pile-up or stretch-out his maneuver. Combine this action with fire and movement into adversary flank and/or rear from strengthened adjacent sectors/zones to:
  - slow momentum and blow adversary away (during pile-up) or
  - channel momentum then decapitate and break-up cohesion of thrust (during stretch-out).

Mental Picture

- Think of obstacles, delay, hit-and-run, and baited retreats together with "shaping" and "disruption" activities as Cheng or Nebenpunkte to create gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears by the pile-up/congestion or stretch-out of adversary maneuver.
- Think of Ch'i or Schwerpunkt maneuver (fire and movement) hitting unexpectedly thru gaps into adversary flank/rear, or blind-side, as a decisive stroke to pull enemy apart and roll-up his isolated remnants.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

TACTICS

Action

- Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored recce teams, with mobile anti-tank teams, artillery, and "shaping"/"disruption" activities in support, as Nebenkunkte to determine direction/strength of thrusts and (by local front/flank combinations) to continuously harass with repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks. Object is to:
  - disorient adversary;
  - provide information to senior commanders to help them decide which sectors to thin-out and which to strengthen;
  - pile-up or stretch-out adversary maneuver to "shape" (or disrupt) tempo/rhythm and pattern of Blitz attack as well as create gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears.
  
- Inconspicuously move-in with high speed mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams together with air and artillery support as Schwerpunkt to strengthen appropriate sectors that flank adversary thrusts. From here, exploit gaps, or any other vulnerabilities and weaknesses, to ambush adversary with fire together with sudden/sharp flank and rear counter-thrusts into his forward, roll-out, and resupply efforts moving through out thinned-out sectors. Object is to work Schwerpunkt in harmony with Nebenkunkte in order to break-up cohesion and roll-up isolated remnants of Blitz thrusts.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

GRAND MANEUVER

Mental Picture

- Imagine the fluid Cheng/Ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt counter-operations just discussed to be Super Nebenpunkte operations that are used to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength. Idea is to set-up and launch a Blitz counter-stroke, or Super Schwerpunkt, deep into adversary weakness while he (with his strength) is preoccupied in overcoming the challenge posed by the Super Nebenpunkte operations.

Action

- Keep pressure on and continually force adversary to adapt to many abrupt and irregular changes generated by the ongoing Super Nebenpunkte operations.
- When adversary is strung-out, or disconnected, and vulnerable: Unleash swift armored forces (held in reserve) together with air to hook-in behind and roll-up adversary Blitz as well as push-off for a Blitz Counteroffensive. Shift forces, as appropriate, from local Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations (as well as from other sectors) into this Super Schwerpunkt to both generate and exploit a decisive success.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

CAUTION

- Extensive use of many lower-level Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt actions across many sectors/zones drains-away resources needed for fewer but decisive large scale Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations.
- Furthermore, experience has shown, when under active pressure, it is difficult to disengage forces committed to these local efforts and shift them to the larger operation.
- In this sense, these many shallow lower-level actions or maneuvers across a broad front tend to take-on the character Battle or Attrition Warfare while deep, large scale (up to theater level) Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations take-on the character of Strategic Maneuver.



COUNTER-BLITZ  
a'la Sun Tzu

Underlying Idea

Pull adversary apart and bring about his collapse by causing him to generate or project mental images that agree neither with the faster tempo/rhythm nor with the hidden form of the transient maneuver patterns he must compete against.



BLITZ/COUNTER-BLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

OR

MANSTEIN DIVINED



OUTLINE

- BACKGROUND
- STRATEGIC DESIGN



BACKGROUND

- BATTLE OF LEUCTRA AND LEUTHEN
- BATTLE OF CANNAE
- SCHLIEFFEN STRATEGIC MANEUVER



OBSERVATION

Single envelopment schemes (a'la Leuctra, Leuthen, or Schlieffen) take less force than double envelopment schemes (a'la Marathon or Cannae) to achieve the same benefit.




STRATEGIC DESIGN

- POLAND
- FRANCE
- RUSSIA



# POLAND 1939



CONCENTRIC CANNAE WITH LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN UNDERTONE



POLAND 1939


KEY POINT

GERMANS HAD MORE FORCES THAN POLES.




# FRANCE 1940

## PHASE I



LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN

## PHASE II



ECCENTRIC CANNAE WITH  
LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN WINGS




## FRANCE 1940

### KEY POINTS

- GERMANS HAD FEWER FORCES THAN ALLIES BEFORE PHASE I.
- GERMANS HAD MORE FORCES THAN ALLIES BEFORE PHASE II.



# RUSSIA 1941



The drive in Russia 1941

ECCENTRIC CANNAE WITH TWO LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN WINGS




RUSSIA 1941

KEY POINT

GERMANS HAD FEWER FORCES THAN RUSSIANS.



# CAUCASUS/STALINGRAD 1942





BLITZ/COUNTER-BLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen

- Manstein - France (Phase I) 1940.
- ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
- Manstein - Kerch Peninsula 1942.
- OKW/OKH - Caucasus/Stalingrad Counterstroke 1942.
- Manstein - Donetsk Counterstroke 1943.
- Manstein Proposal - Counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943.
- Rundstedt/Rommel Proposal - Normandy 1944.
- Ardennes - 1944-45.

Cannae--with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen Undertone

- Poland - 1939.
- France (Phase II) - 1940.
- Russia - 1941.
- Kursk - 1943.



? - NATURAL QUESTION - ?

HOW COME GERMANS DID NOT ATTEMPT A LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN  
STRATEGIC MANEUVER AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1941??



B.H. LIDDELL HART — "THE GERMAN GENERALS TALK" — 1948

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Rundstedt

"The 1941 operations in Russia should, in my opinion have had their main effort directed, not at first towards Moscow, but towards Leningrad. That would have linked up with the Finns. Then, in the next stage, should have come an attack on Moscow from the north, in co-operation with the advance of Field-Marshal von Bock's Army Group from the west."

BLITZ/COUNTER-BLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen

- Manstein - France (Phase I) 1940.
- Rundstedt Proposal - Thrust to Leningrad followed by thrust (roll-up) to South and take Moscow - 1941.
- Manstein - Kerch Peninsula 1942.
- OKW/OKH - Caucasus/Stalingrad Counterstroke 1942.
- Manstein - Donetz Counterstroke 1943.
- Manstein Proposal - Counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943.
- Rundstedt/Rommel Proposal - Normandy 1944.
- Ardennes - 1944-45.

Cannae--with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen Undertone

- Poland - 1939.
- France (Phase II) - 1940.
- Russia - 1941.
- Kursk - 1943.



MESSAGE

Only Manstein (and few others) knew how to synthesize and apply the experiences and ideas of Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, and Schlieffen in a strategic as well as a grand tactics sense.

WRAP-UP



### WRAP-UP

#### Message

- He who is willing and able to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity, and harmony--as basis to create as well as adapt to the more indistinct - more irregular - quicker changes of rhythm and pattern, yet shape focus and direction of effort--survives and dominates

or contrariwise

- He who is unwilling or unable to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity, and harmony ... goes under or survives to be dominated.

## WRAP-UP

### Game

- Create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes or imagines (Cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those he must react to (Ch'i/Schwerpunkt)

as basis to

- Penetrate adversary organism to sever his moral bonds, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert or seize those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon

thereby

- Pull adversary apart, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist.

### How

- Get inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops (at all levels) by being more subtle, more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker--yet appear to be otherwise.



## WRAP-UP

### Implications

- In a tactical sense, these multi-dimensional interactions suggest a spontaneous, synthetic/creative, and flowing action/counteraction operation, rather than a step-by-step, analytical/logical, and discrete move/countermove game.
  - In accepting this idea we must admit that increased unit complexity (with magnified mental and physical task loadings) does not enhance the spontaneous synthetic/creative operation. Rather, it constrains the opportunity for these timely actions/counteractions.

or put another way
  - Complexity (technical, organizational, operational, etc.) causes commanders and subordinates alike to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interactions--hence they cannot adapt to rapidly changing external (or even internal) circumstances.
- In a strategic sense, these interactions suggest we need a variety of possibilities as well as the rapidity to implement and shift among them. Why?
  - Ability to simultaneously and sequentially generate many different possibilities as well as rapidly implement and shift among them permits one to repeatedly generate mismatches between events/efforts adversary observers or imagines and those he must respond to (to survive).
  - Without a variety of possibilities adversary is given the opportunity to read as well as adapt to events and efforts as they unfold.



#### WRAP-UP

- Alternatively--by stripping away and recombining some of the comments associated with "Clausewitz", "Grand Tactics", "Message", "Game", "How", and "Implications"--we can say:
  - Variety/Rapidity allow one to:

Magnify adversary friction hence stretch-out his time to respond in a directed way.
  - Harmony/Initiative permit one to:

Diminish own friction hence compress own time to exploit variety/rapidity in a directed way.
  - Altogether Variety/Rapidity/Harmony/Initiative enable one to:

Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos, ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.
- Simultaneously--by repeatedly rolling-thru O-O-D-A loops while appealing to and making use of the ideas embodied in "Grand Strategy" and "Theme for Vitality and Growth"--we can:
  - Evolve and exploit Insight/Initiative/Adaptability/Harmony as basis to:

Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while isolating our adversaries and undermining their resolve and drive) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.



### WRAP-UP

--or summarizing in another, yet similar way--

We have in a nutshell:

#### The Art of Success

- Appear to be an unsolvable cryptogram while operating in a directed way to penetrate adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse his will to resist.

yet

- Shape or influence events so that we not only magnify our spirit and strength but also influence potential adversaries as well as the uncommitted so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.

EPILLOGUE



COMMENT

- Reflection upon the previous discussion and reflection upon the various Principles of War that are bandied about leave one unsettled about the real value associated with these principles.
- To illustrate, let's take a look at some of the Principles of War (or Military Art).

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

| <u>USA</u>          | <u>United Kingdom</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u>                           | <u>France</u>              |
|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| ● Objective         | ● Aim/Goal            | ● Mobility/Tempo                              | ● Concentration of Efforts |
| ● Offensive         | ● Coordination        | ● Concentration                               | ● Freedom of Action        |
| ● Mass              | ● Offensive           | ● Surprise                                    | ● Economy of Forces        |
| ● Economy of Forces | ● Freedom of Action   | ● Combat Activeness                           |                            |
| ● Maneuver          | ● Concentration       | ● Preservation of Combat Effectiveness        |                            |
| ● Unity of Command  | ● Economy of Efforts  | ● Conformity of Goal/Plan to Actual Situation |                            |
| ● Security          | ● Surprise            | ● Coordination/Interworking                   |                            |
| ● Surprise          | ● Security            |                                               |                            |
| ● Simplicity        | ● Morale              |                                               |                            |
|                     | ● Control of Rear     |                                               |                            |



### CRITIQUE

- A list of principles does not reveal how individual principles interact nor the mechanism for doing so.
- Scientific laws and principles are the same for all countries and tend to change little over time. On the other hand, we note that the Principles of War are different for different countries and change more dramatically over time. Furthermore, they do not make evident the importance of variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative as basis to shape and adapt to circumstances—a necessary requirement for success in the uncertain and everchanging environment of conflict or war.
- This would suggest that the principles are not principles. Instead, they seem to be some kind of a (shifting) static check of laundry list of what should be adhered to.

ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY

- With this critique in mind, if we still feel we need some guidance why not evolve statements that reflect the essence of conflict dynamics in a connected sense

or put another way

- Why not collect appropriate bits and pieces and assemble them in a coherent way to present a more satisfying picture.



#### APPROPRIATE BITS AND PIECES

- Compress own time and stretch-out adversary time.
- Generate unequal distributions as basis to focus moral-mental-physical effort for local superiority and decisive leverage.
- Diminish own friction (or entropy) and magnify adversary friction (or entropy).
- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops or get inside his mind-time-space.
- Penetrate adversary organism and bring about his collapse.
- Amplify our spirit and strength, drain-away adversaries' and attract the uncommitted.

CENTRAL THEME

Evolve and exploit insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony together with a unifying vision, via a grand ideal or an overarching theme or a noble philosophy, as basis to:

- Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success,

yet be able to

- Operate inside adversary's observation-orientation-decision-action loops or get inside his mind-time-space as basis to:
- Penetrate adversary's moral-mental-physical being in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse his will to resist.



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